Five years since the collapse of the USSR

A balance sheet of capitalist restoration

The following is an edited version of an interview with Vladimir Volkov of the Cheliabinsk Bureau of the Fourth International. It was first published in Neue Arbeiterpresse, the newspaper of the Socialist Equality Party of Germany.

Q: More than five years have passed since the introduction of capitalist "reforms" in Russia. What has been the result?

VV: Yeltsin said that these measures would lead to a rapid rise in the standard of living of the majority of the population. The introduction of private property would supposedly overcome what was declared to be the main obstacle -- the nomenclature, i.e., the privileged bureaucracy.

The results of these "reforms" are quite different. The capitalist market policies have led to a massive drop in the standard of living and to cultural decline. Health care and education have sharply deteriorated. Scientific research has been gutted. Almost all of the social gains won through the hard work and sacrifice of generations of Soviet workers have been destroyed.

The power of the old nomenclature has not only remained intact, it has grown. Former party functionaries and state factory directors were able to enrich themselves. They have become the ardent champions of private property. They dream of not only matching the wealth and luxury of the western capitalists, but exceeding it. Their entrepreneurial activities are of a semi-criminal character. Alongside them exists a purely criminal bourgeois layer which plays an exceptionally important role in the Russian economy.

The Russian economy is in severe crisis. The level of production continues to sink. In some sectors of the economy it is down to 10% of what is was at the end of the 1980s. Only half of all taxes are collected. A significant section of the employers prefer to bribe officials, so as to disguise the real character of their business activities. A large number of financial transactions are in cash, using so called "black money." Almost half of the economy is carried out "in the shadows," outside any state control.

The political crisis of the government is underscored by its default on payments to foreign and domestic creditors. The authorities are not able to pay workers' outstanding wages, salaries or pensions. The government has been forced to take out many loans with domestic and foreign banks and borrow money on the financial markets. The servicing of this debt accounts for 40% of the state budget. The regime is trying to postpone paying off domestic debts by exchanging and issuing state bonds. This takes place against the background of enormous capital flows abroad, now running at 1 billion to 2 billion US dollars a month.

Q: How is this crisis effecting the population?

VV: The situation for the greater part of the Russian population is tragic. On average, pensions are about $56 a month. According to official statistics, the average income is $131 a month. Food and other daily necessities are very expensive. People spend hours searching for shops where they can save a few pennies.

Despite relatively low rents, almost a third of tenants face large arrears. The situation is even worse in the countryside and in regions such as the extreme North, Siberia and the Far East.

A number of articles appeared early this year on the cities of Prokopjevsk and Kisiljovsk in the Kemerovsk region, near the Kusbass. People had to walk miles to work in the bitter cold because the transport workers were on strike. They would walk to the mines each day even though they hadn't been paid for months. At home they had neither water nor heat, because the local authority workers were on strike. With their water turned off, many removed their baths and toilets and sold them in order to make ends meet or pay the rent. They had no hope of buying back these basic facilities.

Q: What lies behind the conflicts taking place in the top political echelons?

VV: Social differentiation has reached a very sharp level in Russia and brings about quite different moods within the various layers of society.

Those who have accumulated enormous wealth are happy with the changes and want to preserve the status quo, so they can hang onto what they have plundered. They fear losing it all, especially since most of them came by their wealth in highly dubious ways.

At the other pole of society are the overwhelming majority, who have been thrown into a situation marked by poverty, spiritual devastation and exhaustion. Viewing events from their personal experience, they for the most part regard the present state of affairs as a complete social decline, tantamount to the end of civilisation and culture. This is particularly so among the former Soviet intelligentsia, who in the past never had to worry about their material needs.

It is important to view the unfolding processes in their entirety. They are the result of the complex and contradictory integration of the former Soviet economy into the world market.

On the one hand, there have been some positive changes, above all with regard to technique and the possibilities this brings. You can now read newspapers and receive television or radio broadcasts from any country in the world, buy high quality imported goods, use the Internet, e-mail and so on. This was quite unthinkable until recently.

However, the way in which the former Soviet economy has been integrated into the world market can only be described as barbaric, producing catastrophic consequences for the oppressed majority of the population.

The alternatives before the former Soviet Union are not the world market or isolated national economic development. The economy of the former Soviet Union will inevitably become a part of the world economy. But it will either become part of the world profit system of capitalism, or a unified, planned and democratically organised world economy of socialism. There is no nationalist alternative.

Q: How is this related to the history of Russia?

VV: The crisis in which Russia now finds itself is the result of a long process, the outcome of which was not decided in advance.

The Soviet economy not only experienced times of downturn, but also times of advance and progress. In the two decades following the Second World War, in a period of reconstruction, rapid growth set in. Living standards rose and extensive social reforms were introduced.

There was widespread optimism about the future development of the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1950s, following the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party. Many believed these developments would lead to a rise in the standard of living and further democratisation. This is the period dubbed the "thaw."

The situation began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, at a time when the international economy was hit by a deep crisis. All over the world there were student protests, America was defeated in the Vietnam War, and the Bretton Woods settlement was collapsing. This pushed the capitalist world market into a new stage of development, which was closely linked to the newly developing technologies in computers and communications.

The Stalinist bureaucracy was not interested in developing these new scientific advances in the Soviet Union, as it did not want to endanger its totalitarian monopoly on power. It became an absolute brake on the further development of the Soviet economy, openly revealing its counter-revolutionary character.

The consequences of the crisis that hit the Soviet Union were seen over the next 15 to 20 years. In order to save its authority, the bureaucracy embarked on a series of extreme economic measures and intensified political oppression. It introduced the so-called "fight against consumerism." Anybody who wished to dress normally or eat normal food was said to be unworthy, with low or so-called non-communist morals. This term was employed exclusively to the benefit of the ruling bureaucracy.

This led to a deep alienation on the part of various social layers. The opinion spread that the Soviet economy was organically unable to develop and that a planned economy was ineffective. Such views were later used to justify the restoration of capitalism in the years of perestroika.

In the 1970s and '80s, against a background of economic crisis, corruption developed by leaps and bounds inside the bureaucracy. Its degeneration increased, as did its internal differentiation. The Stalinist bureaucracy came to understand that the privileges it enjoyed on the basis of Soviet property relations could no longer keep pace with their potential financial gains as owners of private capital. A significant section began to reject any concept of socialist development and to go over to the open repudiation of the October Revolution and the working class.

Gorbachev's perestroika opened up the possibilities for the free development of contradictory tendencies that had been artificially suppressed for years by the totalitarian apparatus.

The issue was objectively posed before the working class:

How to explain the history of the Soviet Union, understand the origins of the crisis, draw the lessons of the struggle of the Left Opposition against Stalinism, grasp the international significance of the October Revolution, build its own organisation and unite with its brothers and sisters in other countries.

On the other side, the various layers inside the bureaucracy began to articulate their own conceptions regarding the restoration of capitalism.

The question was, which class forces would carry the day? Either the working class would develop its class consciousness, overthrow the bureaucracy and revive true Soviet authority, opening the way to unite its struggle for socialism with the international struggles of the world proletariat; or the bureaucracy would dictate a programme of capitalist "reforms," impose a defeat on the working class and destroy the social gains which generations of working people in the Soviet Union had brought about.

Q: How was the bureaucracy able to hold sway?

VV: Today, we are forced to say that the class consciousness of the working class and its active mobilisation lagged far behind the implementation of capitalist restoration. The working class was unable to act as an independent political force when a sharp crisis emerged within the bureaucracy in August 1991. Workers did not support either of the opposing factions, but they were forced to come to terms with the result of this crisis, which led to the introduction of capitalism and the juridical dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

Q: What was the role played by the imperialist powers?

VV: World imperialism was interested in the dissolution of the Soviet Union because the globalisation of the world economy has intensified the competitive struggle between the capitalists. This forces them to scour every corner of the world for raw materials, cheap labour and markets for their products.

The Soviet Union was a source of cheap raw materials and possessed an educated work-force. It was also a potential market. The main aim of the capitalist concerns, however, was to destroy the basis of the Soviet economy. To this end, it was necessary to destroy the Soviet Union.

International capital followed the developments inside the former nomenclature very closely during the first years of so-called liberalisation and the "shock therapy" of Gaider and Yeltsin. The possibilities that opened up with privatisation and market reform lead to the enrichment of a very narrow circle and their criminalisation and corruption.

Instead of democracy, a dreadful alliance of former Stalin supporters and open bandits came into being. These elements were not interested in any sort of economic development, only their personal enrichment.

The establishment of Mafia-type structures is now regarded by foreign companies as an obstacle to their activities in the former Soviet Union. The enrichment of the new Russian bourgeoisie is also leading to these criminal methods being carried into the prosperous countries of Europe and America, on the basis of illegal trade in weapons, drugs and precious metals. In this way they can gather forces and become competitive on the world market.

World capitalism is utilising the deep crisis gripping Russia to push forward a new programme of capitalist reforms. This should lead to the liquidation of these commercial Mafia structures and their replacement by the normally exploitative large corporations. The present conflict in the Russian ruling class arises from these demands. Only a small group of the new Russian bourgeoisie and politicians support the plans of world capitalism. The majority do not wish to lose their wealth and privileges.

At the same time, they fear the working class. The only way they can win even limited support from an increasingly indignant working class is by deepening nationalist ideology and resurrecting the darker sides of the political and spiritual history of Russia.

This is the one position which unites the various factions. Parties such as "Our House is Russia" under Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, the fascist LDPR of Zhirinovsky and the Stalinist CPRF of Zyuganov all agree on opposing the new programme of capitalist reforms that the Moscow government is trying to push through.

The actions of this government reflect the need to concentrate the decisive levers of power in the hands of the central government and begin new attacks under the slogan of law and order. The faction represented by Anatoli Chubais and Boris Nemzov in the Kremlin is numerically very small, but it has gained key positions in the state apparatus. It enjoys the support of the international financial institutions.

In March, Chubais announced the start of a new shock therapy programme. This has a double aim -- to open the way for the large international corporations to develop their business activities and to launch a new attack on the working class.

Q: What measures are envisaged?

VV: They include local government reforms, reform of the pension system and further attacks on all social rights. Everyone living in a publicly owned apartment will have to sign a new contract with commercial companies, which will try and squeeze the last penny out of tenants' pockets. Those unable to pay their back rent will be thrown out.

Pensions will now be calculated in relation to personal income. This will be a very heavy blow for young people, who have no possibility of finding well-paid work or saving for their old age.

A new taxation system will mean a rise in indirect taxation and a change in the income tax regulations. Even supporters of these reforms say this will mean heavy cuts in living standards.

These measures will bring about extremely sharp social and political conflicts. They were worked out in collaboration with the major institutions of international capital, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The bankruptcy of capitalist reforms in Russia implies the bankruptcy of all liberal politics. It is proof that capitalism is incapable of resolving the growing social and economic problems.

Q: How have the political parties developed in the five years since the reintroduction of capitalist market relations?

VV: All the parties which dominate official political life are products of the degeneration of the Stalinist CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). The main tendencies have existed for some time, since the 1930s, as ideological tendencies inside the Stalinist bureaucracy -- economic liberalism, nationalism of the so-called "left" stripe, and fascism. All these tendencies unfolded very rapidly on the foundations of perestroika.

Liberalism enjoyed relatively strong support even before 1992-93. At the end of perestroika the movement "Democratic Russia" held meetings of several thousands in Moscow, Petersburg and other cities.

Gaider's party, which came out of this movement, "Russia's Democratic Way," enjoyed significant support among the urban petty-bourgeoisie and the privileged intelligentsia. It lost its influence and popularity following shock therapy and the disappointment with market reforms. It and Boris Federov's "Forwards Russia" barely play a role today. Gaider's party became a political satellite of Anatoli Chubais and, as the latter assumed a key role in the Kremlin, gained some fresh support.

Another liberal party is "Yabloko" ("Apple"), headed by Yavlinski. It claims to defend the purest ideals of liberalism and democracy, but possesses exactly the same character as Gaider's party and the existing regime. During the elections last year, Yavlinski, in order to push through his own variation of shock therapy, demanded the same dictatorial powers as Yeltsin.

The fascist party of Zhirinovski, the LDPR, gained mass support on the wave of Gaider's reforms, when broad layers of the population were thrown into poverty and desperation. Zhirinovski's demagogy and populist criticism of Yeltsin's policies won the attention of the population, but since the parliamentary elections of 1993 he has been losing influence.

His party has become an instrument of organised crime. The most well-known criminal big-wigs are in its ranks, so they can enjoy parliamentary immunity from prosecution. In the recent period a number of Zhirinovski's parliamentary deputies' assistants (up to 300) have been murdered. They obtained their posts for cash and used them to enrich themselves.

The largest of the other fascist organisations is "Russian National Unity" of Barkashchov, which openly encourages pro-pogrom sentiments and venerates Hitlerite fascism. It is supported by various commercial concerns. The "fighters" of this organisation work as watchmen for some suspected criminal commercial structures. It has its greatest influence in Moscow and in the south of the country, in the Stavropol and Krasnojarsk region, where there are Cossacks and refugees from the wars in Chechnya, Karabakh and other conflicts in the Caucasus.

The fascist movement as a whole is in decline. Most of the fascist groups are experiencing heavy membership losses or are no more than small circles.

Special attention must be paid to the few dozen Stalinist "communist" parties. They all arose as break-offs from the CPSU, when it was banned in the autumn of 1991 as the Soviet Union collapsed. The largest is the "Communist Party of the Russian Federation," the CPRF, headed by Zyuganov. It arose much later than the others and was founded in 1993. At the end of the perestroika period, Zyuganov was the deputy chief ideologue in the Central Committee of the CPSU.

During 1992 Zyuganov acted as a pure nationalist and did not utter the word "socialism." The CPRF assembled the most elitist sections of the former Soviet nomenclature, who hoped for revenge on the basis of the deep disappointments and growing social protests that developed after the shock therapy of Gaider.

Autumn 1993 was a decisive turning point for the fortunes of the CPRF. All of the Stalinist parties supported the then-leadership of the Russian Supreme Soviet, which was fighting Yeltsin. They were all banned as a result. Zyuganov alone was able to participate in the subsequent parliamentary elections because he was the most moderate figure of this political wing.

The CPRF officially puts its membership at 500,000-600,000. But it obtained this figure by "re-registering" all of the existing members of the old CPSU, without even asking their agreement! The other Stalinist remnants are indistinguishable from Zyuganov's party, if one ignores their rhetoric against Zyuganov himself.

Apart from some conjunctural upswings in 1992 and 1993, all the Stalinist communist parties have steadily lost membership and influence. Only 5% of the registered members of Zyuganov's party are active, whilst the number who regularly pay contributions is even smaller.

There are grounds for speaking of an enormous decline and even disintegration of the Stalinist movement in Russia. One of the reasons is that the leaders of these parties adopt nostalgic and conservative positions. They all assume that Yeltsin is just an accidental figure and not the product of a deep-going social process, and that the working class will be forced back into their clutches with the next wave of aborted liberalisation and shock therapy.

This is not the case. The decline of the Stalinist movement is a sign that the Russian working class can overcome the moral and political crisis in which it finds itself.

Q: What political developments are taking place among the workers of the former Soviet Union?

VV: The disintegration of the Stalinist "communist" parties is presently accompanied by a general turn away from politics on the part of workers. But despite the decline of the workers' movement since 1991, there are definite and visible signs of a revival. Seen as a whole, it is a contradictory process, which contains a positive potential. Without, however, coming to terms and breaking with the politics of the Stalinist parties, the workers' movement cannot be revived and cannot rise again as a truly revolutionary and international movement.

There has been an increase in spontaneous protests. The number of strikes is rising and the duration of each strike has increased to several days. Not a day passes without reports of a strike somewhere. The main demand is for payment of outstanding wages. The spread of protests is proof that the working class is beginning to move.

On March 27 there was a mass protest organised by the trade unions. According to official figures some 20 million people took part. Their mood was considerably more radical than that of the organisers.

While even successful strikes cannot permanently resolve the problems which gave rise to them, this wave of protests is bound to seek a political expression. The only answer is the programme of international socialist revolution and the unification of workers for the building of a planned and democratically organised world economy.

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